Ecole Normale Supérieure
more problems (which would be true in a situation where a student has solved exactly one difficult problem), but rather that none of my students has solved any problem at all. In a nutshell, horses and difficult problems in the a) sentences receive an at least twointerpretation, while they receive an at least one-interpretation in the b) sentences. One can wonder whether this kind of behavior is restricted to Bare Plurals (or, in French, to DPs headed by des), or is found with full DPs as well. In fact, plural DPs headed by some display a similar behaviour, though this is harder to show due to the fact that such DPs, being positive polarity items, cannot take scope immediately below negation. Consider however: (3) There was a set of problems. Some of them were easy, others were difficult. I know for sure that … a) Jack solved some difficult problems b) it is impossible that Jack solved some difficult problems Again, while (3)a conveys that Jack solved at least two difficult problems, (3)b, on the reading where some is interpreted within the scope of impossible, does not merely assert that it is impossible that Jack solved at least two difficult problems, but rather that it is impossible that he solved even one difficult problem. 1 One more fact:
(4) a. Exactly one of my students has solved difficult problems b. Exactly one of my students has solved some difficult problems (4)a is equivalent to none of the following sentences:
(5) a. Exactly one of my students has solved at least one difficult problem b. Exactly one of my students has solved two, or more than two, difficult problems Indeed, (5)a (on the reading where at least one difficult problem takes scope below exactly one of my students) is true in a situation where one student, say Jack, has solved exactly one difficult problem, and no other student has solved any problem, while, intuitively, (4)a suggests that the only student who has solved a problem has solved at least two problems. On the other hand, (5)b is true in a situation where one student, say Jack, has solved exactly two problems, and all other students have solved exactly one problem; but, intuitively, (4)a entails that no student, apart from the unique one who has solved difficult problems, has solved any problem at all. In fact, the most natural interpretation we get for (4)a is the following:
(6) One of my student has solved several difficult problems, and all other students have solved no difficult problem at all.
The same point can be made with respect to (4)b, though one must be careful, in this case, not to ignore the fact that, on one reading, some difficult problems takes scope over exactly one students. On the other reading, though, where some difficult problems takes narrow-scope, we get the interpretation given in (6).
This last fact shows that the various possible readings of bare plurals and some NPs (hereafter, plural indefinites) cannot be adequately described in terms of an ambiguity of plural indefinites between an at least two and an at least one reading.
Though the existence of the at least one-reading for bare plurals has been recognized long ago (partly in relation with the phenomenon of dependent plurals), there is, to my knowledge, no theory available that accounts for the exact distribution of the various readings; Sauerland (2004b) notes that the at least-one reading is found in monotone decreasing contexts, and provides a tentative account of this fact (see section VI), but, as far as I can see, doesn't provide an account of the kind of reading exemplified in (6), nor of the readings that arise within the scope of a universal quantifier (see section IV. 2). I'll return to Sauerland's proposal in section VI.
II. Sketch of the analysis
The hypothesis I will defend in this paper is the following: the meaning of plural morphology (on nouns) is in itself insufficient to account for at least two-readings. In particular, what compositional semantics delivers in the case of (1) is the proposition that the homework contains at least one difficult problem. The at least two-reading, in this case, is derived as an implicature, based on the comparison of (1) with a sentence whose propositional content is equivalent to 2 (7):
(7) The homework contains exactly one difficult problem Since (7) is stronger than (1), one can conclude, from the maxim of quantity, that the author of (1) does not hold the belief that the homework contains exactly one difficult problem. An additional step leads from this inference to the stronger one that the author of (1) believes that the homework doesn't contain exactly one difficult problem, which together with the fact that he is supposed to believe that (1) is true, leads to the conclusion that the speaker believes that the homework contains at least two difficult problems. This additional step, whose motivation 2 In section III, this hypothesis will be derived from a notion that I term higher-order implicature.
is not entirely obvious, is present in most present-day theories of scalar implicatures, in order to account, for instance, for the not all inference triggered by some in increasing contexts 3 .
This simple hypothesis makes a direct prediction: the plural reading should disappear in monotone decreasing contexts. The "strengthened" meaning that scalar terms get in monotone increasing context (some but not all for some, exclusive reading for the disjunction) is indeed absent in decreasing context, due to the reversal of entailment patterns, which reverses the informativity ordering within the set of alternatives. In the case at hand, what happens is that that the sentence one gets by replacing an expression like difficult problems with exactly one difficult problem is not stronger, but weaker, than the original sentence if difficult problems occurs in a monotone decreasing context, so that the reasoning sketched above for (1) will not apply.
This prediction, which already accounts for the readings of (1)b and (2)b, also accounts for the interpretations of the following examples:
(8) a. Every student who has solved some difficult problems will be rewarded b. Every person who has seen horses will come up c. It is impossible that Jack solved difficult problems d. Every time Jack sees horses, he gets afraid (8)a entails that every student who has solved one, and only one, difficult problem, will be rewarded, (8)b that every person who has seen one, and only one horse will come up, and (8)c that it is impossible that Jack solved even one difficult problem. Finally, in (8)d, the phrase 'every time that Jack sees horses' quantifies over all situations in which Jack sees one, or more than one, horse 4 .
What about cases where the plural indefinite occurs in a non-monotonic context ? According to some standard accounts of scalar implicatures, non-monotonic contexts should cancel scalar implicatures, because they give rise to alternatives that are not ordered with respect to each other in terms of logical strength.
Illustration:
(9) a. Exactly one student read all of Balzac's novels b. Exactly one student read most of Balzac's novels Suppose (9)a is the only scalar alternative of (9)b; since (9)a does not entail (9)b, a speaker who utters (9)b who also believes that (9)a is true will not have violated Grice's maxim of quantity, since it is not the case that the other alternative he could have truthfully used (i.e.
(9)a) is strictly more informative 5 . Still, let us see what happens if we add to the literal meaning of (9)b the negation of (9)a:
(10) Exactly one student read most of Balzac's novels, and it is not the case that exactly one student read all of Balzac's novels. This is provably equivalent to:
(11) Exactly one student read most of Balzac's novels, he didn't read them all, and no other student read most of Balzac's novels.
It turns out that (11) is, intuitively, the pragmatic meaning of (9)b. This suggests that scalar implicatures are not simply derived by negating stronger alternatives. Many recent works (Chierchia 2002 , Sauerland 2004a , van Rooij & Schulz 2004 , 2005 have argued that such a procedure yields too strong results in some cases (cf. "the problem of multiple disjunctions"), and too weak results in other cases. Following van Rooij & Schulz (2004) , and Spector (2006) , I assume that the strengthened meaning of any sentence S whose scalar alternatives is the set ALT(S) is given by the application of an exhaustivity operator, as defined below:
exh(S) = {w: S is true in w and ¬∃w'(S is true in w' and w'< S w} 6 , with w'< S w if the members of ALT(S) true in w' are a proper subset of the members of ALT(S) true in w.
The reader will check that in case ALT(S) contains only one member besides S itself, call it S', then:
More generally, for most of the cases discussed in this paper, the exhaustivity operator can be described as follows 7 :
Let S be a sentence; let ALT*(S) be defined as: ALT*(S) = {S': S ∈ ALT(S) ∧ S does not entail S'}. Then exh(S) = ^(S ∧ ¬S 1 ∧ ¬S 2 ∧…. ∧ ¬S n ), where {S 1 ,…, S n } = ALT*(S) 8 .
In the case of (8)b, the predicted strengthened meaning is therefore exactly the one paraphrased in (11). Let us now return to (4)a, repeated below as (12):
(12) Exactly one of my students has solved difficult problems Assume that (12) has only one other alternative, which is equivalent to (13)a and (13)b:
(13) a. Exactly one of my students has solved exactly one difficult problem b. There is a unique student who has solved one difficult problem and hasn't solved more than one 6 In the whole paper, propositions are viewed as sets of worlds. 7 The definition that follows, which is close to Krifka's (1993) semantics for only, is not equivalent to the previous one in the general case, but will suffice for most examples. Van Rooij & Schulz (2005) shows that the Krifka-inspired exhaustivity operator fails to make accurate predictions for some sentences in which a disjunction is embedded under an other scalar item. I will not consider such cases in this paper. The Krifkainspired exhaustivity operator yields the same reading as the "official" one whenever it does not yield the contradictory proposition. 8 I am using here an informal notation: '^…' is to be read as "the proposition that…is true".
Since (12) does not entail (13), the application of the exhaustivity operator to (12) yields the proposition that is expressed by the conjunction of (12) and the negation of (13). Recall that the literal meaning of (12), by hypothesis, is Exactly one of my students has solved at least one difficult problem:
Exactly one of my students has solved has solved difficult problems, and it is not the case that there is a unique student who has solved one difficult problem and no more.
This is equivalent to:
(15) Exactly of my students has solved several problems, and all other students have solved no problem at all.
As argued above, (15) shows that the problem of the distribution of at least one and at least two readings for plural indefinites is independent of the question how existential readings for bare plurals are derived. However, due to the various additional constraints that regulate the 9 The existence of generic readings for bare plurals, the phenomenon of quantificational variability, as well as the fact that existential bare plurals must take narrow-scope with respect to other operators, have motivated various proposals in which bare plurals are not treated as quantifiers, but as referring to kinds or properties. See for instance Carlson (1977) , Diesing (1992) , Chierchia (1998) , Dayal (1999) , among many others.
interpretation of DPs headed by some (i.e. the fact the such DPs are positive polarity items, and that they can receive a specific interpretation), I will mostly be concerned with sentences in which a bare plural receives an existential interpretation. Beck & Sauerland (2000) , is fully compatible with my general account. 11 Francis Corblin (p.c.) suggests that French plural indefinites headed by des are interpreted as number-neutral when they occur in a subordinated discourse condition structure as defined by Discourse Reprensentation Theory (cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993) . Such an account predicts number-neutral readings as soon as the plural indefinite is under the scope of an operator that is not a singular indefinite, and therefore captures both dependent plurals and number-neutral readings in decreasing contexts. Such a move cannot easily account for the kind of readings exemplified by (12), and does not account either for the reading of plural indefinites within the scope of a distributive universal quantifier (see section IV. 2). The need for a specific account of dependent plurals is shown by the following contrast (which also holds for the corresponding French sentences): (a) (All) the professors are wearing ties (b) #Every professor is wearing ties See also Corblin (1987) The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section III spells out the proposal, based on the notion of higher-order implicature, and applies it to simple cases such as The homework contains difficult problems. Section IV discusses the consequences of the proposal for more complex cases, such as those in which a plural indefinite is within the scope of a nonmonotonic quantifier or a universal quantifier. In the latter case, I will show that we make different predictions depending on how exactly alternatives are defined. Section V shows that even in contexts where a plural indefinite gets an at least one-reading, something of the at least two-reading is preserved, under the form of a modal presupposition; I argue that a similar pattern is found with disjunction (something of the exlusive reading is preserved even in context where a disjunction is truth-conditionally clearly interpreted as inclusive), which motivates further the treatment of at least two-readings in terms of implicatures. Section VI presents and discusses a proposal by Sauerland (2003 Sauerland ( , 2004b , which is in part similar to mine. Section VII is the conclusion.
III. The proposal

III.1. Background assumptions about the semantics of plural NPs
Semantic accounts of plural morphology can be roughly divided into two types. Based on the existence of at least two interpretations, one can postulate that the denotation of a bare plural of the form NPs is the set of all groups 12 of cardinality more than one whose atomic individuals are in the extension of NP. In other words, if, in a given model, the extension of the singular noun horse is {a, b, c}, then that of horses is {a+b, a+c, b+c}. This is, for instance, Chierchia's (1998) view. As a result, a sentence such as Jack saw horses ends up equivalent to There is a group of at least two horses such that Jack saw this group. The at least two reading is therefore a direct consequence of compositional semantics. The main shortcoming of this approach is that, obviously, the negation of the previous sentence, i.e.
Jack didn't seen horses, is predicted to be true if Jack has seen exactly one horse, contrary to fact.
I will assume, on the contrary, that the plural morpheme denotes a function which applies to a set of atomic individuals and returns the set of all individuals that are made up of these atomic 12 I use the word group in an informal manner. See below for the formal implementation.
individuals. That is, if, in a given model, the denotation of horse is {a, b, c}, then that of horses is {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c}. This is in line with Schwarzschild (1996) 13 .
In other words, I am assuming the following semantics for the plural morpheme:
Ontology: Each model is based on a domain of individuals which is structured by a partwhole relation (a partial order), such that, for any two individuals x and y, there exists a unique individual z, noted x+y (the mereological sum of x and y), such that x is a part of z, y is a part of z, and z is a part of any z' that also contains x and y as parts. Furthermore, there exist atomic individuals, i.e. individuals whose only parts are themselves. The structure that is commonly used to embody these axioms is that of a join semi-lattice. I take the denotation of a singular NP to be a set of atomic individuals. x≼X reads as "x is a part of X" (⊆ is used only to represent standard set-theoretic inclusion):
On the other hand, the singular morpheme has no specific semantic import 15 
On the other hand, (16)'s predicted meaning is:
Because λX. Jack saw X is a distributive predicate, the following equivalence generally holds,
It is clear that (16) entails (17). But it turns out that (17) entails (16). Suppose indeed that Jack saw a certain group X of horses. Because he must then have seen every atomic member of X, he must have seen at least one atomic horse. It is therefore impossible to reason as if (16) asymmetrically entailed (17).
III. 2 The mechanism: higher-order implicatures
My main proposal is that when computing the pragmatic "strengthened" meaning of (17), we take into account not only the literal meaning of its only competitor, but also its strengthened meaning. Note indeed that (16) itself implicates the following:
(18) Jack saw exactly one horse
The assumption that the computation of the pragmatic meaning of a given sentence should take into account not only the literal meanings of its competitors, but also their own pragmatic meaning is entirely natural in a gricean framework: scalar implicatures, indeed, are not only inferences produced by the hearer regarding the speaker's mental state; as they are based on general conversational principles, the speaker himself knows that the hearer will derive them, which is why he can be said to mean them, i.e. to take responsibility not only for the literal reading of his utterance, but for its pragmatic implications as well. For this reason, the fact that a given sentence triggers a certain implicature is truly common knowledge; it follows that there is no reason whatsoever why pragmatic processes that are based on the assumption that a given sentence competes with its alternatives should not take into account the implicatures of the competitors as well as their literal meanings. In this sense, the hypothesis that higherorder implicatures exist is the null hypothesis.
In the case at hand, one can implement the mechanism as follows: I assume that bare plurals contain a null plural determiner, whose singular syntactic counterpart is the indefinite article a/an 17 , noted as Ø pl . I do not want to assume that this null determiner is responsible for the existential reading of bare plurals; it may be semantically null as well 18 . I furthermore assume that the singular morpheme and the plural morpheme constitutes a scale. The scalar alternatives or a given sentence are obtained by (possibly multiple) substitutions of a scalar item with a member of the same scale, together with all the adjustments that are required by agreement rules 19 . In the case at hand, Ø pl NP-pl gets replaced with a NP-sg. On the other hand, I assume that the singular indefinite articles a and some compete with several, to the effect that a sentence like There is a horse in the garden triggers the implicature that There 17 though I do not want to assume that Ø pl and a have the same semantic contribution. The existence of a null determiner in bare plurals is of course debatable. Nothing essential in this paper hinges on this hypothesis, which is made only for the sake of explicitness. 18 I don't want to commit myself to any specific analysis as to how existential readings are derived for bare plurals. 19 To illustrate: "Two students have read this book" is an alternative of "One student-sg has read this book"
aren't several horses in the garden. I therefore postulate the two following scales: <pl, sg> and <a, several>. The mechanism giving rise to higher-order implicatures can be formalized as follows 20 :
For any S, I call i 0 (S) the literal interpretation of S (a proposition, i.e. a set of worlds), which is the result of compositional semantic rules, and ALT(S) the set of its scalar alternatives. I call ALT 0 (S) the set of the propositions that are expressed by the members of ALT(S). In other terms: ATL 0 (S) = {φ:
The first-order pragmatic meaning of S is then noted i 1 (S), and defined as follows:
i 1 (S) = {w: w ∈ i 0 (S) ∧ ¬∃w' (w' ∈ i 0 (S) ∧ w'< S,0 w)}, with:
w'< S,0 w if the members of ALT 0 (S) that are true in w' are a proper subset of the set of members of ALT 0 (S) that are true in w.
Then we define inductively, for any n, and any S, ALT n (S) and i n (S), as follows:
-ALT n (S) = {φ: ∃ S' (S'∈ ALT(S) ∧ φ = i n (S')} -i n+1 (S) = {w: w ∈ i n (S) ∧ ¬∃w' (w' ∈ i n (S) ∧ w'< S,n w)}, with:
w'< S,n w if the members of ALT n (S) that are true in w' are a proper subset of the set of members of ALT n (S) that are true in w'.
For any n, i n+1 (S) is the exhausitive interpretation of S relatively to the semantic values of S's alternatives at step n. In other words, i n (S) is the n th -order pragmatic meaning of S.
Whenever each alternative set contains only two members, one can rephrase this inductive definition as follows:
if S' is the unique alternative of S, then i n+1 (S) = i n (S) ∧¬i n (S') if i n (S) does not entail i n (S'). Otherwise, i n+1 (S) = i n (S). By hypothesis, the scalar alternatives of these three sentences are as follows (assuming that several itself is not part of a scale, which is certainly a simplifying assumption, but one that does not in fact affect the general result; if we assumed the scale <several, many>, for instance, this would not affect the pragmatic meaning of (19)):
ALT((19)) = {Jack saw horses, Jack saw a horse} ALT((20)) = {Jack saw a horse, Jack saw horses, Jack saw several horses} ALT((21)) = {Jack saw several horses}
We first need to turn these sets of sentences into the sets of propositions that are the literal meanings of these sentences. For any S, I note ^S the proposition that S expresses. By hypothesis, we have: i 0 ((19)) = ^Jack saw at least one horse i 0 ((20)) = ^Jack saw at least one horse i 0 ((21)) = ^Jack saw at least two horses
As ALT((19)) includes two equivalent sentences (given the semantics I am assuming for the plural morpheme), ALT 0 ((19)) will contain only one proposition:
ALT 0 ((19)) = {^Jack saw at least one horse}
We also get:
ALT 0 ((20)) = {^Jack saw at least one horse, ^Jack saw at least two horses} ALT 0 ((21)) = {^Jack saw at least two horses} For any n, and any sentence S, I say that a given proposition S' is a level-n alternative of S if S' belongs to ALT n (S).
At the next stage, we compute the exhaustive reading of each of these three sentences with respect to its level-0 alternatives. As (19) and (21) have no level-0 alternative distinct from themselves, they are obviously equivalent to their exhaustive readings, and we thus have:
i 1 ((19)) = ^Jack saw at least one horse i 1 ( (21) ALT 1 ((19)) = {^Jack saw at least one horse, ^Jack saw exactly one horse} ALT 1 ((20)) = {^Jack saw exactly one horse, ^Jack saw at least two horses} ALT 1 ((21)) = {^Jack saw at least two horses}
The level-2 reading of (19) is then given by: 21 In the whole paper, I make an informal use of propositional logic notation : ¬S, where S is a proposition (and not a sentence), represents the negation of S, i.e, in set theoretic terms, its complementary set. Likewise, ∧ and ∨ are used to represent intersection and union in case we are dealing with propositions, i.e. sets of words, and not sentences. Furthermore, I often use a sentence to name the proposition that it expresses.
i 2 ((19)) = i 1 ((19)) ∧ ¬i I ((20)) = ^(Jack saw at least one horse and Jack didn't see exactly one horse) = ^Jack saw at least two horses. This is the desired result.
On the other hand, we have i 2 ((20)) = i 1 ( (20)) ∧ ¬i i ( (21)). But because i i ( (20)) anyway entails the negation of i i ( (21)), this is simply equivalent to: i 2 ((20)) = i 1 ( (20)). Likewise, i 2 ((21)) = i 1 (21), which is itself equal to i 0 ( (21)). The reader will convince himself that for any n > 1, i n ((20)) = i 1 ( (20)) and i n ((21)) = i 0 ( (21)) At this point, let me consider what happens at the next stage for (19). We have:
ALT 2 ((19)) = {^Jack saw at least two horses, ^Jack saw exactly one horse}
As the two members of this set are mutually incompatible, i 2 ((19)) ∧ ¬i 2 ( (20)) is equivalent to i 2 ((19)), from which it follows that i 3 ((19)) = i 2 ( (19)). In fact, for any n > 2, i n ((19)) = i 2 ( (19)).
It is fortunate that for each example, we reach a state after which its interpretation cannot be altered by any number of additional applications of the exhaustivity mechanism. Otherwise, we might expect an indefinite process that never yields a final pragmatic interpretation. In the appendix, I prove that, under certain hypotheses, this is always the case: for any sentence S, there exists an integer n such that for any m > n, i m (S) = i n (S) 22 . In fact, in stereotypical cases of scalar implicatures, the final interpretation is reached at level 1, which makes the concept of higher-order implicature empirically irrelevant. In order for there to be higher-order implicatures, we in fact need highly unusual scales. and not […. several NPs….] ) will not take place, thus blocking higher-order implicatures for the original sentence.
IV. More complex cases
22 I thank Philippe Schlenker for pointing out this issue.
IV. 1. Non-monotonic contexts
Let me now return to sentence (4)a (repeated below as (22)), i.e. to a case where the plural indefinite is interpreted within the scope of a non-monotonic quantifier:
(22) Exactly one of my students has solved difficult problems
In section II, I assumed that this sentence's only alternative was:
(23) Exactly one of my students has solved exactly one difficult problem However, this assumption is no longer valid; rather, the only alternative for (22) This turns out to be equivalent to:
i 1 ( (24)) =^(Exactly one of my students has solved exactly one difficult problem, and no other student has solved any problem at all)
Note that this last proposition is distinct from ^(Exactly one of my students has solved exactly one difficult problem). The prediction that i 1 ( (24)) is the pragmatic reading of (24) seems to be correct, and is a strong argument in favour of an exhaustivity-based account of scalar implicatures 24 .
The level-1 alternatives of (22) are therefore given by the following set:
ALT 1 ((22)) = {i 1 ( (22)), i 1 ( (24))} = {^Exactly one of my students has solved at least one problem, ^(Exactly one of my students has solved exactly one difficult problem and no other student has solved any problem at all)} We now have to compute i 2 ( (22)), i.e. i 1 ( (22)) ∧ ¬i 1 ( (24) Let me prove that (25) entails (26): suppose (25) is true. Then there is a student, call him Jack, who solved a difficult problem, and is such that all other students have solved no difficult problem. Suppose Jack had solved exactly one difficult problem. Since it is not the case that exactly one student has solved exactly one difficult problem and no other student has solved any difficult problem, it follows that either a student different from Jack has solved exactly one difficult problem, or that Jack is the only one that has solved exactly one difficult problem but there are other students that have solved a difficult problem; in both cases, there must be a student different from Jack who has solved a difficult problem, which is contradictory (since Jack is the only one who solved a difficult problem). Therefore Jack has solved several difficult problems; furthermore, no other student solved any difficult problem.
(26) entails (25): suppose (26) is true. There is then a unique student, call him Jack, who solved several difficult problems, and all other students have solved no difficult problem at all. Jack is also the only student who solved at least one difficult problem, and it is furthermore the case that there is no student who solved exactly one difficult problem, from which the truth of (25) follows.
We therefore end up with the same interpretation as in section II for (12), a welcome result.
IV. 2. Bare plurals under the scope of a universal quantifier
Consider the following sentence:
(27) Yesterday, every student solved (some) difficult problems 25 Most informants report the following: on the one hand, one tends to understand, from sentence (27), that every student solved several difficult problems. On the other hand, if uttered in a situation where every student solved at least one difficult problem, and only some of them solved several difficult problems, the sentence is not judged false. Finally, in a situation where every student has solved exactly one difficult problem, the sentence is felt as "misleading", as one informant puts it. We are therefore dealing with very delicate judgments.
It seems that though (27) suggests that every student solved several difficult problems, it is not incompatible with a situation in which some students solved only one while all the others solved more than one problem. For this reason, I assume that (27) can have one of the two following readings 26 :
(28) a. Yesterday, every student solved several difficult problems b. Yesterday, every student solved at least one difficult problems, and at least one student solved several difficult problems I call the a) reading the "strong reading" and the b) reading the "weak reading".
Before turning to the predictions that are made by a theory in terms of higher-order implicatures, let me first see what the predictions are if we assume that difficult problems competes directly with exactly one difficult problem. Under such a hypothesis, (27)'s alternative would be:
(29) Yesterday, every student solved exactly one difficult problem
As (29) is not entailed by (27), the predicted strengthened meaning for (27) is the conjunction of (27)and the negation of (29), i.e.:
(30) Yesterday, every student solved at least one problem, and not every student solved exactly one difficult problem This is in turn equivalent to:
(31) Yesterday, every student solved at least one problem, and at least one student solved several problems Such a hypothesis therefore predicts the weak reading. What about the predictions made by the analysis in terms of higher-order implicatures ?
As we'll see in a moment, the predictions that are made in this case depends on the exact way we characterize alternatives. Because the sentence contains two scalar items (every student, difficult problems), one has to wonder whether both of them contribute to the definition of alternatives. I will show that if only the alternatives induces by the plural indefinite are reading is true and the b. reading is false. However, as explained above, speakers tend to infer (28)a from (27), while they acknowledge at the same time that the truth of (28)b is enough to deem (27) true.
"activated", then we end up with the strong reading. On the other hand, if both every student and difficult problems are "activated", i.e. contribute both to the definition of the alternatives, then we end up with the weak reading (see below).
Ignoring, for the moment, the fact that every student may well itself induce additional alternatives (given the fact that every and some belongs to the same scale -since this is necessary to derive the fact that not every student came implicates some students came), the only alternative of (27) (repeated below as (32)) is (33): (32) Yesterday, every student solved difficult problems (33) Yesterday, every student solved a difficult problem
These two alternatives are, as far as their literal meaning is concerned, equivalent. It follows that the level-1 meaning of (32) is the same as its level-0 meaning, i.e. its literal meaning.
But (33), by hypothesis, competes with (34) (34) Yesterday, every student solved several difficult problems As a result, the level-1 interpretation of (33) is expressed by (35):
(35) Yesterday, every student solved a difficult problem and not every student solved several difficult problems
It follows that the level-2 reading of (32), which is equivalent to the conjunction of its level-1 meaning and the negation of the level 1-meaning of its competitor, is given by (36):
(36) Yesterday, every student solved at least one difficult problem and it is not the case that every student solved a difficult problem and that not every student solved several difficult problems
The reader will check that this is in fact equivalent to:
(37) Yesterday, every student solved several difficult problems
The theory in terms of higher-order implicatures is therefore able to derive the strong reading.
More generally, as long as we don't take into account the alternatives that may be induced by the presence of other scalar items, we predict that a plural indefinite that occurs in a monotone increasing context will always get an at least two interpretation 27 , even when it is under the scope of some other operator. Let me show this informally.
Let S(NPpl) be a sentence containing a plural indefinite NPpl that occurs in an increasing ALT 0 ((38)) = {^every student solved at least one difficult problem, ^some student solved at least one difficult problem}
Since the first member of this set entails the second one (as soon as there exist students), the meaning of (38) at stage 1 is the same as its literal meaning: i 1 ((38)) = i 0 ( (38)). In order to compute i 2 ((38)), we must first determine the content of ALT 1 ( (38)), i.e. the strengthened meanings of all of the alternatives of (38):
Alternatives of (39) ALT 0 ((39)b) = {^every student solved at least one difficult problem, ^every student solved at least two difficult problems, ^some student solved at least one difficult problem, ^some student solved at least two difficult problems}
In order to compute i 1 ( (39)b), we apply the exhaustivity operator to (39)b relatively to ALT 0 ( (39)b), which results in the conjunction of ( (39) (38) (listed in (39)):
i 1 (((39)c) = ^some student, but not all the students, solved at least one difficult problem i 1 ((39)d) = ^some student solved exactly one difficult problems, and not every student solved a problem Therefore, ALT 1 ((38)) = {^every student solved at least one difficult problem, ^every student solved exactly one difficult problem, ^some student, but not all, solved at least one difficult problem, ^some student solved exactly one difficult problem, and not every student solved a problem} In order to compute i 2 ((38)), we need, for each sentence S of ALT 1 ( (38)) that is not entailed by i 1 ((38)), to add the negation of S. In the case at hand, the members of ALT 1 ((38)) that are not entailed by i 1 ((38)) are the following ones:
(41) a. every student solved exactly one difficult problem b. some student, but not all, solved at least one difficult problem c. some student solved exactly one difficult problem, and not every student i 2 ((38)) = i 1 ((38)) ∧ ¬(^every student solved exactly one difficult problem) = every student solved at least one difficult problem, and at least one student solved several difficult problems
We therefore now derive the weak reading, a welcome result as well. The theory in terms of higher-order implicatures is thus able to predict both the weak and the strong reading, provided we allow different options regarding the way alternatives are characterized. We have to assume that some scalar items can be ignored when we compute alternatives. The exact constraints that regulate the computation of alternatives when several scalar terms are present are in themselves a topic for research.
V The reason for the oddness of (42)b is felt as obvious: such a sentence suggests that it is at least possible to have several fathers. If we were talking about adoptive fathers in a society where one can be adopted by several men, then (42)b would be perfectly natural. It could seem that this phenomenon is readily explained by the fact that it makes no sense to deny something that is obviously false: because Jack has fathers conveys that Jack has several fathers, something which we know is false, there is no point to negate it. This reasoning, however, is in this case obviously flawed; indeed, as we explained at length, the truth-conditional content of (42)b when it is appropriate (as in the case where we are talking about adoptive fathers) is equivalent to Jack has no father, and not to Jack doesn't have several fathers. As noticed before, (42)b and (42)c are hardly distinguishable, and, at the very least, have the same truth-conditional content 29 .
More generally, it seems that even in cases where a bare plural NPpl receives an at least-one interpretation, it triggers the presupposition that the predicate of which the bare plural is an argument could be true of more than one NP. This general property is further illustrated by the following examples. (45) <context: every student must read at least one paper among a certain list of papers; it is advisable, though not compulsory, to read several papers> a. I forgot to read a paper b. I forgot to read papers
Where could such a condition come from ? We could of course include a presuppositional condition in the semantic characterization of plural indefinites. As I will now show, such a move would miss a generalization that pertains to all scalar items. Let me first sum up our observations in the following table: pragmatic interpretation of a plural indefinite presupposition increasing contexts at least two reading decreasing contexts at least one reading Poss(…at least two…)
Poss(…at least two…) is a schematic way of representing the presupposition according to which it was compatible with common knowledge, before the sentence was utterred, that the predicate of which the bare plural NP is an argument be true of at least two NPs. Consider the following context: Peter and Jack are siamese brothers. As a result, it is impossible to meet Peter without meeting Jack, and the other way around. That is, common knowledge excludes that Mary met Peter or Jack but not both; she either met both or none of them. The prediction is that the above sentence should be inappropriate in this case, and this prediction seems to be correct. To see why this fact is surprising, one must pay attention to the fact that, in such a context, the following four sentences are contextually equivalent 30 :
(46) a. Mary didn't meet Peter and Jack b. Mary didn't meet Peter or Jack c. Mary didn't meet Peter 30 Two sentences are contextually equivalent in a given context if they are true in exactly the same worlds among those that are compatible with common knowledge before the sentence is uttered.
d. Mary didn't meet Jack
Since, in this context, it is common knowledge that Mary met neither Jack nor Peter, or met both Jack or Peter, all these four sentences are true only in situations in which Mary met both.
Yet only (46) In this case, it could be argued that the reason why (47)a is preferred to all others is due to the maxim of quantity: among these four alternatives, the speaker ought to choose the one that is logically the strongest. Note, however, that such an explanation works only if we force this kind of pragmatic mechanism to have no access to contextual knowledge: indeed, these sentences are contextually equivalent, so that if the maxim of quantity takes into account a contextual notion of logical strength, the above reasoning is invalid, as none of these sentences is contextually strictly stronger than another one. 32 Furthermore, such an account would make wrong predictions in the case of (46); indeed, in this case, the sentence that is actually chosen is the one that is logically the weakest (the variant with and).
At the moment, I can offer no convincing account of these contrasts, a topic that I leave for further research 33 . However, the main point of this discussion is to stress the similarity between the behavior of plural indefinites and at least some other scalar items: it seems to be a 31 A caveat: maybe (46) c is better if it is known that, for some reason, Mary wanted to meet Peter (and, as a result, Jack as well) because she has a specific question to ask him, and not Jack. Likewise for (46)d, substituting Jack for Peter and Peter for Jack. 32 Danny Fox (p.c.) argues, on the basis of similar facts, that the computation of scalar implicatures is not a purely pragmatic process, but is governed by a set of rules that are context-independent. 33 Danny Fox (p.c.) made a suggestion that can be reformulated in the following way: when all the members of a given alternative set are contextually equivalent, none of them can be used felicitously. This is apparently falsified by the appropriateness of the variant with and in the siamese brothers context. D. Fox, however, notes that in such a context, Mary met both Peter and Jack is infelicitous, as it suggests that Mary could have met one without the other; he suggests that Peter and Jack can be seen as ambiguous between the quantifier "both Peter and Jack" and a definite description ("the group made up of Peter and Jack"), in which case the definite description variant would not be part of a scale. I don't see, however, how to extend such an account to the modal presupposition triggered by plural indefinites.
general fact that some scalar items, even in contexts where they lose their "strengthened" meaning, induce a modal presupposition in which the strengthened meaning resurfaces. Sauerland (2003 Sauerland ( , 2004b and Sauerland et al. (2005) suggest a pragmatic and semantic analysis of the singular/plural distinction which shows clear similarities with the present proposal. According to him, the singular morpheme triggers the presupposition that the denotation of its sister (the noun or NP it combines with) includes only atomic individuals.
VI. Sauerland's alternative
The plural morpheme, on the other hand, has no semantic contribution (it denotes the identity function). He furthermore assumes that there exists a phonologically null operator, noted *, which turns a predicate into its distributive variant, so that, if a given predicate is true of {a, b, c}, then the operator yields a predicate that is true of {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c}. This operator applies freely, but, given the presupposition induced by the singular morpheme, a structure like [sg * NP] is always ill-formed. The result is that when the distributivity operator is present, then the plural morpheme must be used. This, however, does not prevent as such the plural morpheme from applying to a predicate that is true only of atomic individuals.
Consider, in this respect, the following two sentences:
(48) Jack met the student (49) Jack met the students
In the case of (48), the uniqueness presupposition triggered by the student is explained in the following manner: since student is singular, it must denote a set of atoms, which entails that the operator * is absent. Assuming a standard maximality based-semantics (Link 1983) for the definite article, we derive that the student must denote the maximal element in the denotation of student, and presupposes that such a maximal element exists. But this condition can only be met if the denotation of student-sg contains only one atom. Let me turn to (49): in this case, the plural morpheme imposes no specific condition on the denotation of students. Whatever this denotation is, the students denote the maximal individual that is in the denotation of students; if * is present, we end up with the individual that contains all students as parts. In a situation where there exists only one student, the students will actually denote the only student that exists. This is not a welcome result, as in such a situation, (49) an atomic entity that is a problem, while (51)b asserts that the homework contains a group of at least one problem. Given that the predicate "being contained in the homework" is distributive, these two sentences have in fact the same literal content, just as in my own account. Now Maximize presupposition ! applies to the scope of the existential operator, which, by assumption, is present in the logical form of (51)a (51) process is incorporated into the scope of the existential operator, one gets the homework contains several difficult problems, which is strictly stronger than the literal reading of (51)a, and therefore meets the condition imposed by Principle (B). It is clear that in the case of (52)a, one would not get a stronger meaning by means of a similar mechanism, but a weaker one, so that Principle (B) prevents the above-described process to apply, to the effect that we get an at least one-reading for the plural indefinite (and, in fact, in all cases where a plural indefinite occurs in a monotone-decreasing context).
Sauerland must be credited for the generalization that at least two-readings vanish in monotone decreasing contexts, and for making a general case that the interpretative effects of the plural morpheme are to be understood as resulting from a competition between the singular and the plural. In this respect, my own proposal is a direct heir to his. Yet the account sketched by Sauerland seems to me quite stipulative, mostly because of the role played by
Principle (B) . In addition to the lack of motiviation for this principle, one has to provide an explicit description of how Maximize presupposition ! works at the level of a sub-constituent, and it seems to me that Sauerland (2005) does not provide a complete formal description of this mechanism. As observed above, it is not clear at all how one gets, from the negation of the presupposition attached to a singular NP (i.e. the negation of the presupposition that the extension of the NP contains only atomic individuals), to the conclusion that the extension of the corresponding plural NP contains only non-atomic individuals. Note also that principle the same way as Sauerland does: if students denotes the set of all groups of students, while student denotes the set of all individual students, then the students denotes the maximal element in the denotation of students, i.e. the maximal group of students, and the student denotes the unique student, if there is only one student; Maximize pressupposition ! then predicts that in case it is known that there is only one student, the students should be blocked by the student
VII. Conclusion
This paper's central claim is that at least two-readings of plural indefinites are a special kind of scalar implicature: they arise from the fact that the plural morpheme competes with the singular morpheme, and from the existence of a mechanism of higher-order implicatures, to the effect that the scalar implicatures triggered by the competitors of a given sentence are taken into account for the computation of the pragmatic meaning of the sentence in question. I
have offered an explicit formalization of this mechanism.
I assumed that the strengthened meaning of a given sentence is equivalent to the result of an application of an exhaustivity operator; this as such does not mean that the actual process whereby scalar implicatures are derived involves an exhaustivity operator. Rather, as shown by van Rooij & Schulz (2004) and Spector ( , 2005 Spector ( , 2006 , the exhaustivity operator can be viewed as a shortcut, i.e. as a way of computing the result of a purely pragmatic reasoning.
I am agnostic as to whether or not one should incorporate an exhausitivity mechanism into the grammar proper; let me note that if we choose to do so, it is possible to implement the present account by allowing the presence of an indefinite number of exhaustivity operators in the logical form of a given sentence 36 .
-ALT(S) ⊆ X -∀S 1 ∀S 2 (S 1 ∈ X ∧ S 2 ∈ ALT(S 1 ) → S 2 ∈ X)
Finiteness condition: S meets the finiteness condition if *ALT(S) is finite FACT TO BE PROVED:
If *ATL(S) is finite, then there exists an integer n such that for any m > n, i m (S) = i n (S)
Proof:
First note that, for any n, and any m greater that n, i m (S) ⊆ i n (S). Suppose the fact that has to be proved were false. In this case, for any n, there exists an integer m greater than n such that i m (S)≠i n (S), i.e., given that i m (S) ⊆ i n (S), i m (S) ⊂ i n (S). I will show that this leads to a contradiction.
Assume now that *ALT(S) is finite
Notation: given two worlds w 1 and w 2 , 'w 1 ≅ S w 2 ' means: ∀S' ∈ *ALT(S), w 1 ∈ i 0 (S') if and only if w 2 ∈ i 0 (S') (in words: the members of *ATL(S) whose literal meanings are true in w 1 are the same as those whose literal meaning are true in w 2 ". Obviously, ≅ S is an equivalence relation. For any world w, I note w /S its equivalence class relatively to ≅ S . Since *ALT(S) is finite, there is a finite number of equivalence classes (since each equivalence class is uniquely determined by the truth value of each member of *ALT(S), there is at most 2 m equivalence classes, where m is the cardinality of *ALT(S)).
Let us assume the following lemma, which will be proved below:
Lemma:
For any S' in *ATL(S), and any n, i n (S') is the union of a subset of all the equivalence classes. In other words, if a given world w is in i n (S'), then its whole equivalence class is included in i n (S'), i.e. w /S ⊆ i n (S')
Assume that the FACT is false, i.e. that there exists an integer m greater than n such that i m (S) ⊂ i n (S). It follows that there exists an infinite sequence <j1, j2, j3,….> such that for any
